(a) The chancery and circuit courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile court to terminate parental or guardianship rights to a child in a separate proceeding, or as a part of the adoption proceeding by utilizing any grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights permitted in this part or in title 37, chapter 1, part 1 and title 37, chapter 2, part 4. All pleadings and records filed in the chancery and circuit courts pursuant to this section shall be placed under seal and shall not be subject to public disclosure, in the same manner as those filed in juvenile court, unless otherwise provided by court order.
 

(b)(1) The prospective adoptive parent or parents, including extended family members caring for a related child, a licensed child-placing agency having physical custody of the child, the child’s guardian ad litem, or the department have standing to file a petition pursuant to this part or title 37 to terminate parental or guardianship rights of a person alleged to be a parent or guardian of the child, pursuant to § 36-1-117(a). The prospective adoptive parents, including extended family members caring for a related child, have standing to request termination of parental or guardianship rights in the adoption petition filed by them pursuant to this part.
 

(2)(A) When one (1) of the child’s parents has been convicted of aggravated rape pursuant to § 39-13-502, rape pursuant to § 39-13-503, or rape of a child pursuant to § 39-13-522, from which crime the child was conceived, the child’s other parent has standing to file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the convicted parent.
 

(B) When one (1) of the child’s parents has been convicted of one (1) of the offenses specified in subdivision (g)(11)(A)(ii), the child’s other parent has standing to file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the abusive parent.
 

(C) When one (1) of the child’s parents or legal guardians has been convicted of attempted first degree murder or attempted second degree murder of the child’s other parent or legal guardian, the child’s non-offending parent or legal guardian has standing to file a petition to terminate the parental or guardianship rights of the convicted parent or legal guardian.
 

(3) This section does not give a parent or legal guardian standing to file a petition to terminate parental or guardianship rights based on grounds other than those listed in subdivision (b)(2).
 

(4) The court shall notify the petitioning parent that the duty of future child support by the parent who is the subject of the termination petition will be forever terminated by entry of an order terminating parental rights.
 

(c) Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based upon:
 

(1) A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights have been established; and
 

(2) That termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the best interests of the child.
 

(d)(1) The petition to terminate parental rights may be made upon information and belief and shall be verified. If a parent whose parental rights are proposed for termination is the legal parent of the child, as defined in § 36-1-102, and if such parent is alleged to be deceased, then diligent efforts must be made by the petitioner to verify the death of such parent. Upon proof satisfactory to the court that such parent is deceased, no further action shall be required to terminate parental rights of that person.
 

(2)(A) The petition to terminate parental rights shall state:
 

(i) The child’s birth name;
 

(ii) The child’s age or date of birth;
 

(iii) The child’s current residence address or county of residence or that the child is in the custody of the department or a licensed child-placing agency;
 

(iv) Any other facts that allege the basis for termination of parental rights and that bring the child and parties within the jurisdiction of the court;
 

(v) Any notice required pursuant to subdivision (d)(4) has been given; and
 

(vi) The medical and social history of the child and the child’s biological family has been completed to the extent possible on the form promulgated by the department pursuant to § 36-1-111(j); provided, however, the absence of such completed information shall not be a barrier to termination of parental rights.
 

(B) Initials or pseudonyms may be used in the petition in lieu of the full names of the petitioners to promote the safety of the petitioners or of the child, with permission of the court;
 

(3)(A) The petition to terminate parental rights must state that:
 

(i) The Tennessee putative father registry has been consulted prior to the filing of the petition or will be consulted within ten (10) working days thereafter unless the biological father has been identified through DNA testing as described in § 24-7-112 and that identification is set out in the petition; and a copy of the response to this inquiry shall be provided to the court immediately upon receipt by the petitioner; and
 

(ii) Notice of the filing of the termination petition has been provided to the Tennessee putative father registry if the child is less than thirty (30) days old at the time the petition is filed.
 

(B) The petition to terminate, or the adoption petition that seeks to terminate parental rights, shall state that:
 

(i) The petition or request for termination in the adoption petition, if granted, shall have the effect of forever severing all of the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians to the child who is the subject of the order, and of the child to the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians;
 

(ii) The child will be placed in the guardianship of other person, persons or public or private agencies who, or that, as the case may be, shall have the right to adopt the child, or to place the child for adoption and to consent to the child’s adoption; and
 

(iii) The parent or guardian shall have no further right to notice of proceedings for the adoption of the child by other persons and that the parent or guardian shall have no right to object to the child’s adoption or thereafter, at any time, to have any relationship, legal or otherwise, with the child, except as provided by contract pursuant to § 36-1-145.
 

(4) The petition to terminate parental rights, if filed separately from the adoption petition, may be filed as provided in § 36-1-114. If the petition is filed in a court different from the court where there is a pending custody, dependency, neglect or abuse proceeding concerning a person whose parental rights are sought to be terminated in the petition, a notice of the filing of the petition, together with a copy of the petition, shall be sent by the petitioner to the court where the prior proceeding is pending. In addition, the petitioner filing a petition under this section shall comply with the requirements of § 36-1-117(e).
 

(e) Service of process of the petition shall be made as provided in § 36-1-117.
 

(f) Before terminating the rights of any parent or guardian who is incarcerated or who was incarcerated at the time of an action or proceeding is initiated, it must be affirmatively shown to the court that such incarcerated parent or guardian received actual notice of the following:
 

(1) The time and place of the hearing to terminate parental rights;
 

(2) That the hearing will determine whether the rights of the incarcerated parent or guardian should be terminated;
 

(3) That the incarcerated parent or guardian has the right to participate in the hearing and contest the allegation that the rights of the incarcerated parent or guardian should be terminated, and, at the discretion of the court, such participation may be achieved through personal appearance, teleconference, telecommunication or other means deemed by the court to be appropriate under the circumstances;
 

(4) That if the incarcerated parent or guardian wishes to participate in the hearing and contest the allegation, such parent or guardian:
 

(A) If indigent, will be provided with a court-appointed attorney to assist the parent or guardian in contesting the allegation; and
 

(B) Shall have the right to perpetuate such person’s testimony or that of any witness by means of depositions or interrogatories as provided by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure; and
 

(5) If, by means of a signed waiver, the court determines that the incarcerated parent or guardian has voluntarily waived the right to participate in the hearing and contest the allegation, or if such parent or guardian takes no action after receiving notice of such rights, the court may proceed with such action without the parent’s or guardian’s participation.
 

(g) Initiation of termination of parental or guardianship rights may be based upon any of the grounds listed in this subsection (g). The following grounds are cumulative and nonexclusive, so that listing conditions, acts or omissions in one ground does not prevent them from coming within another ground:
 

(1) Abandonment by the parent or guardian, as defined in § 36-1-102, has occurred;
 

(2) There has been substantial noncompliance by the parent or guardian with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan pursuant to title 37, chapter 2, part 4;
 

(3)(A) The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal custody of a parent or guardian for a period of six (6) months by a court order entered at any stage of proceedings in which a child is alleged to be a dependent and neglected child, and:
 

(i) The conditions that led to the child’s removal still persist, preventing the child’s safe return to the care of the parent or guardian, or other conditions exist that, in all reasonable probability, would cause the child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect, preventing the child’s safe return to the care of the parent or guardian;
 

(ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent or guardian in the near future; and
 

(iii) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child relationship greatly diminishes the child’s chances of early integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home;
 

(B) The six (6) months must accrue on or before the first date the termination of parental rights petition is set to be heard;
 

(4) The parent or guardian has been found to have committed severe child abuse, as defined in § 37-1-102, under any prior order of a court or is found by the court hearing the petition to terminate parental rights or the petition for adoption to have committed severe child abuse against any child;
 

(5) The parent or guardian has been sentenced to more than two (2) years’ imprisonment for conduct against a child that has been found under any prior order of a court or that is found by the court hearing the petition to be severe child abuse, as defined in § 37-1-102. Unless otherwise stated, for purposes of this subdivision (g)(5), “sentenced” shall not be construed to mean that the parent or guardian must have actually served more than two (2) years in confinement, but shall only be construed to mean that the court had imposed a sentence of more than two (2) years upon the parent or guardian;
 

(6)(A) The parent has been confined in a correctional or detention facility of any type, by order of the court as a result of a criminal act, under a sentence of ten (10) or more years, and the child is under eight (8) years of age at the time the sentence is entered by the court; or
 

(B) The parent has been confined in a correctional or detention facility of any type, by order of the court as a result of one (1) or more criminal acts, under a sentence of six (6) or more years, and one (1) or more other grounds within subsection (g) have been satisfied;
 

(7) The parent has been:
 

(A) Convicted of first degree or second degree murder of the child’s other parent or legal guardian; or
 

(B) Found civilly liable for the intentional and wrongful death of the child’s other parent or legal guardian;
 

(8)(A) The chancery and circuit courts shall have jurisdiction in an adoption proceeding, and the chancery, circuit, and juvenile courts shall have jurisdiction in a separate, independent proceeding conducted prior to an adoption proceeding to determine if the parent or guardian is mentally incompetent to provide for the further care and supervision of the child, and to terminate that parent’s or guardian’s rights to the child;
 

(B) The court may terminate the parental or guardianship rights of that person if it determines on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that:
 

(i) The parent or guardian of the child is incompetent to adequately provide for the further care and supervision of the child because the parent’s or guardian’s mental condition is presently so impaired and is so likely to remain so that it is unlikely that the parent or guardian will be able to assume or resume the care of and responsibility for the child in the near future; and
 

(ii) That termination of parental or guardian rights is in the best interest of the child;
 

(C) In the circumstances described under subdivisions (8)(A) and (B), no willfulness in the failure of the parent or guardian to establish the parent’s or guardian’s ability to care for the child need be shown to establish that the parental or guardianship rights should be terminated;
 

(9)(A) The parental rights of any person who, at the time of the filing of a petition to terminate the parental rights of such person, or if no such petition is filed, at the time of the filing of a petition to adopt a child, is the putative father of the child may also be terminated based upon any one (1) or more of the following additional grounds:
 

(i) The person has failed, without good cause or excuse, to make reasonable and consistent payments for the support of the child in accordance with the child support guidelines promulgated by the department pursuant to § 36-5-101;
 

(ii) The person has failed to seek reasonable visitation with the child, and if visitation has been granted, has failed to visit altogether, or has engaged in only token visitation, as defined in § 36-1-102;
 

(iii) The person has failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child;
 

(iv) Placing custody of the child in the person’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child; or
 

(v) The person has failed to file a petition to establish paternity of the child within thirty (30) days after notice of alleged paternity, or as required in § 36-2-318(j), or after making a claim of paternity pursuant to § 36-1-117(c)(2);
 

(B)(i) For purposes of this subdivision (g)(9), “notice” means the written statement to a person who is believed to be the biological father or possible biological father of the child. The notice may be made or given by the mother, the department, a licensed child-placing agency, the prospective adoptive parents, a physical custodian of the child, or the legal counsel of any of these people or entities; provided, that actual notice of alleged paternity may be proven to have been given to a person by any means and by any person or entity. The notice may be made or given at any time after the child is conceived and, if not sooner, may include actual notice of a petition to terminate the putative father’s parental rights with respect to the child;
 

(ii) “Notice” also means the oral statement to an alleged biological father from a biological mother that the alleged biological father is believed to be the biological father, or possible biological father, of the biological mother’s child;
 

(C) For the purposes of this subdivision (g)(9), resuming or starting visitation or support after the filing of a petition seeking to terminate parental or guardianship rights or seeking the adoption of a child does not rectify a ground for termination pursuant to this subdivision (g)(9) and is not a defense to a ground for termination pursuant to this subdivision (g)(9);
 

(10)(A) The parent has been convicted of one (1) of the following offenses from which the child was conceived:
 

(i) Aggravated rape, pursuant to § 39-13-502;
 

(ii) Rape, pursuant to § 39-13-503;
 

(iii) Rape of a child, pursuant to § 39-13-522;
 

(iv) Especially aggravated rape, pursuant to § 39-13-534; or
 

(v) Especially aggravated rape of a child, pursuant to § 39-13-535; and
 

(B) A certified copy of the conviction suffices to prove this ground;
 

(11)(A)(i) The parent has been found to have committed severe child sexual abuse under any prior order of a criminal court;
 

(ii) For the purposes of this section, “severe child sexual abuse” means the parent is convicted of any of the following offenses, or an offense under the laws of another state that is substantially similar, toward a child:
 

(a) Aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect or endangerment, pursuant to § 39-15-402;
 

(b) Aggravated rape of a child, pursuant to § 39-13-531;
 

(c) Aggravated rape, pursuant to § 39-13-502;
 

(d) Aggravated sexual battery, pursuant to § 39-13-504;
 

(e) Aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, pursuant to § 39-17-1004;
 

(f) Especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, pursuant to § 39-17-1005;
 

(g) Incest, pursuant to § 39-15-302;
 

(h) Promoting prostitution, pursuant to § 39-13-515;
 

(i) Rape, pursuant to § 39-13-503;
 

(j) Rape of a child, pursuant to § 39-13-522;
 

(k) Sexual battery by an authority figure, pursuant to § 39-13-527;
 

(l) Statutory rape by an authority figure, pursuant to § 39-13-532; or
 

(m) Trafficking for a commercial sex act, pursuant to § 39-13-309;
 

(B) Deleted by 2022 Pub.Acts, c. 937, § 4, eff. July 1, 2022.
 

(12) The parent or guardian has been convicted of trafficking for commercial sex act under § 39-13-309, or an offense under the laws of another state that is substantially similar;
 

(13) The parent or guardian has been convicted on or after July 1, 2015, of sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or coercion under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, or a sex trafficking of children offense under the laws of another state that is substantially similar to § 39-13-309;
 

(14) A parent or guardian has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child; and
 

(15)(A) The parent or legal guardian has been convicted of attempted first degree murder or attempted second degree murder of the child’s other parent or legal guardian;
 

(B) Deleted by 2022 Pub.Acts, c. 937, § 5, eff. July 1, 2022.
 

(h)(1) The department shall file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents (or, if such a petition has been filed by another party, seek to be joined as a party to the petition), and, concurrently, to identify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified family for an adoption, under the following circumstances:
 

(A) In the case of a child who has been in foster care under the responsibility of the department for fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22) months; or
 

(B) If a court of competent jurisdiction has determined a child to be an abandoned infant as defined at § 36-1-102; or
 

(C) If a court of competent jurisdiction has made a determination in a criminal or civil proceeding that the parent has committed murder of a child, committed voluntary manslaughter of a child, aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit such a murder or such a voluntary manslaughter of a child, or committed a felony assault that has resulted in serious bodily injury or severe child abuse as defined at § 37-1-102 to a child. For the purposes of this subsection (h), such a determination shall be made by a jury or trial court judge designated by § 16-2-502 through an explicit finding, or by such equivalent courts of other states or of the United States;
 

(D) If a juvenile court has made a finding of severe child abuse as defined in § 37-1-102, then a petition required by this subdivision (h)(1)(D) must be filed within ninety (90) days of the finding;
 

(E) If a child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the department for six (6) months or more and the child’s parents have not made reasonable progress toward obtaining custody of the child during the six-month period; or
 

(F) If two (2) or more of the grounds for termination of parental rights set out in subsection (g) apply to the child’s parent.
 

(2) At the option of the department, the department may determine that a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents shall not be filed (or, if such a petition has been filed by another party, shall not be required to seek to be joined as a party to the petition), if one of the following exists:
 

(A) The child is being cared for by a relative;
 

(B) The department has documented in the permanency plan, which shall be available for court review, a compelling reason for determining that filing such a petition would not be in the best interests of the child; or
 

(C) The department has not made reasonable efforts under § 37-1-166 to provide to the family of the child, consistent with the time period in the department permanency plan, such services as the department deems necessary for the safe return of the child to the child’s home.
 

(i)(1) In determining whether termination of parental or guardianship rights is in the best interest of the child, the court shall consider all relevant and child-centered factors applicable to the particular case before the court. Those factors may include, but are not limited to, the following:
 

(A) The effect a termination of parental rights will have on the child’s critical need for stability and continuity of placement throughout the child’s minority;
 

(B) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to have on the child’s emotional, psychological, and medical condition;
 

(C) Whether the parent has demonstrated continuity and stability in meeting the child’s basic material, educational, housing, and safety needs;
 

(D) Whether the parent and child have a secure and healthy parental attachment, and if not, whether there is a reasonable expectation that the parent can create such attachment;
 

(E) Whether the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact with the child and used the visitation or other contact to cultivate a positive relationship with the child;
 

(F) Whether the child is fearful of living in the parent’s home;
 

(G) Whether the parent, parent’s home, or others in the parent’s household trigger or exacerbate the child’s experience of trauma or post-traumatic symptoms;
 

(H) Whether the child has created a healthy parental attachment with another person or persons in the absence of the parent;
 

(I) Whether the child has emotionally significant relationships with persons other than parents and caregivers, including biological or foster siblings, and the likely impact of various available outcomes on these relationships and the child’s access to information about the child’s heritage;
 

(J) Whether the parent has demonstrated such a lasting adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial for the child to be in the home of the parent, including consideration of whether there is criminal activity in the home or by the parent, or the use of alcohol, controlled substances, or controlled substance analogues which may render the parent unable to consistently care for the child in a safe and stable manner;
 

(K) Whether the parent has taken advantage of available programs, services, or community resources to assist in making a lasting adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions;
 

(L) Whether the department has made reasonable efforts to assist the parent in making a lasting adjustment in cases where the child is in the custody of the department;
 

(M) Whether the parent has demonstrated a sense of urgency in establishing paternity of the child, seeking custody of the child, or addressing the circumstance, conduct, or conditions that made an award of custody unsafe and not in the child’s best interest;
 

(N) Whether the parent, or other person residing with or frequenting the home of the parent, has shown brutality or physical, sexual, emotional, or psychological abuse or neglect toward the child or any other child or adult;
 

(O) Whether the parent has ever provided safe and stable care for the child or any other child;
 

(P) Whether the parent has demonstrated an understanding of the basic and specific needs required for the child to thrive;
 

(Q) Whether the parent has demonstrated the ability and commitment to creating and maintaining a home that meets the child’s basic and specific needs and in which the child can thrive;
 

(R) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s home is healthy and safe for the child;
 

(S) Whether the parent has consistently provided more than token financial support for the child; and
 

(T) Whether the mental or emotional fitness of the parent would be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent from consistently and effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision of the child.
 

(2) When considering the factors set forth in subdivision (i)(1), the prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to be in the child’s best interest.
 

(3) All factors considered by the court to be applicable to a particular case must be identified and supported by specific findings of fact in the court’s written order.
 

(4) Expert testimony is not required to prove or disprove any factor by any party.
 

(5) As used in this subsection (i), “parent” includes guardian.
 

(j) In the hearing on the petition, the circuit, chancery, or juvenile court shall admit evidence, pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, and shall recognize the exemptions to privileges as provided pursuant to §§ 37-1-411 and 37-1-614.
 

(k) The court shall ensure that the hearing on the petition takes place within six (6) months of the date that the petition is filed, unless the court determines an extension is in the best interest of the child. The court shall provide a ruling on the petition within thirty (30) days of the conclusion of the hearing and shall enter an order that makes specific findings of fact and conclusions of law within thirty (30) days of the ruling. If an order has not been entered within thirty (30) days from the court’s ruling, then the petitioner or respondent has grounds to request that the court of appeals grant an order expediting entry of the order.
 

(l)(1) An order terminating parental rights shall have the effect of severing forever all legal rights and obligations of the parent or guardian of the child against whom the order of termination is entered and of the child who is the subject of the petition to that parent or guardian. The parent or guardian shall have no further right to notice of proceedings for the adoption of that child by other persons and shall have no right to object to the child’s adoption or thereafter to have any relationship, legal or otherwise, with the child. It shall terminate the responsibilities of that parent or guardian under this section for future child support or other future financial responsibilities even if the child is not ultimately adopted; provided, that the entry of an order terminating the parental rights shall not eliminate the responsibility of such parent or guardian for past child support arrearages or other financial obligations incurred for the care of such child prior to the entry of the order terminating parental rights.
 

(2) Notwithstanding subdivision (l)(1), a child who is the subject of the order for termination shall be entitled to inherit from a parent whose rights are terminated until the final order of adoption is entered.
 

(m) Upon termination of parental or guardian rights, the court may award guardianship or partial guardianship of the child to a licensed child-placing agency or the department. Such guardianship shall include the right to place the child for adoption and the right to consent to the child’s adoption. Upon termination of parental or guardian rights, the court may award guardianship or partial guardianship to any prospective adoptive parent or parents with the right to adopt the child, or to any permanent guardian who has been appointed pursuant to title 37, chapter 1, part 8. In any of these cases, such guardianship is subject to the remaining rights, if any, of any other parent or guardian of the child. Before guardianship or partial guardianship can be awarded to a permanent guardian, the court shall find that the department or licensed child-placing agency currently having custody of the child has made reasonable efforts to place the child for adoption and that permanent guardianship is in the best interest of the child.
 

(n) An order of guardianship or partial guardianship entered by the court pursuant to this section shall supersede prior orders of custody or guardianship of that court and of other courts, except those prior orders of guardianship or partial guardianship of other courts entered as the result of validly executed surrenders or revocations pursuant to § 36-1-111 or § 36-1-112, or except as provided pursuant to § 36-1-111(o)(4)(D) and (E), or except an order of guardianship or partial guardianship of a court entered pursuant to § 36-1-116; provided, that orders terminating parental rights entered by a court under this section prior to the filing of an adoption petition shall be effective to terminate parental rights for all purposes.
 

(o) If the court terminates parental or guardianship rights, under this part or title 37 or a consent is given pursuant to § 36-1-117(f) or (g), or if there have been surrenders of parental or guardianship rights of all other necessary parties, then no further surrender or consent of that parent or guardian shall be necessary to authorize an adoption; provided, that the adoption court may review and confirm the validity of any denials of parentage made by persons under any statutory provisions from outside the state of Tennessee.
 

(p) A copy of the order or orders obtained by the prospective adoptive parents terminating parental or guardianship rights under this section shall be filed with the petition for adoption.
 

(q) After the entry of the order terminating parental rights, no party to the proceeding, nor anyone claiming under such party, may later question the validity of the termination proceeding by reason of any defect or irregularity therein, jurisdictional or otherwise, but shall be fully bound thereby, except based upon a timely appeal of the termination order as may be allowed by law; and in no event, for any reason, shall a termination of parental rights be overturned by any court or collaterally attacked by any person or entity after one (1) year from the date of the entry of the final order of termination. This provision is intended as a statute of repose.
 

(r) The disability of a parent or guardian alone shall not be considered for or against termination of parental or guardian rights unless the disability impacts the parent’s ability to care for the physical or psychological welfare of the child.

(a) A petitioner may, at the time of filing a petition for an order of protection, request that the court issue an order directing a wireless telephone service provider to transfer the billing responsibility for and rights to the wireless telephone number or numbers to the petitioner if the petitioner:

(1) Is not the account holder; and

(2) Proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner and any minor children in the petitioner’s care are the primary users of the wireless telephone numbers that will be ordered transferred by a court under this subsection (a).

(b)(1) An order transferring the billing responsibility for and rights to the wireless telephone number or numbers to a petitioner under subsection (a) must be a separate order that is directed to the wireless telephone service provider.

(2) The order must list:

(A) The name and billing telephone number of the account holder;

(B) The name and contact information of the petitioner to whom the telephone number or numbers will be transferred; and

(C) Each telephone number to be transferred to the petitioner.

(3) The court shall ensure that the petitioner’s contact information is not provided to the account holder in proceedings held under this section.

(4) The order must be served on the wireless telephone service provider’s agent for service of process.

(5) The wireless service provider shall notify the requesting party if the wireless telephone service provider cannot operationally or technically effectuate the order due to certain circumstances, including when:

(A) The account holder has already terminated the account;

(B) Differences in network technology prevent the functionality of a device on the network; or

(C) There are geographic or other limitations on network or service availability.

(c)(1) Upon a wireless telephone service provider’s transfer of billing responsibility for and rights to a wireless telephone number or numbers to a petitioner under subsection (b), the petitioner shall assume:

(A) Financial responsibility for the transferred wireless telephone number or numbers;

(B) Monthly service costs; and

(C) Costs for any mobile device associated with the wireless telephone number or numbers.

(2) A transfer ordered under subsection (b) does not preclude a wireless telephone service provider from applying any routine and customary requirements for account establishment to the petitioner as part of the transfer of billing responsibility for a wireless telephone number or numbers and any devices attached to that number or numbers, including, but not limited to, identification, financial information, and customer preferences.

(d) This section does not affect the ability of the court to apportion the assets and debts of the parties as provided for in law, or the ability to determine the temporary use, possession, and control of personal property under this chapter.

(e) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, no cause of action shall lie in any court nor shall any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding be commenced by a governmental entity against any wireless telephone service provider, or its directors, officers, employees, agents, or vendors, for:

(1) Action taken in compliance with an order issued under this section;

(2) A failure to process an order issued under this section, unless the failure is the result of gross negligence, which must be shown by clear and convincing evidence; or

(3) Providing in good faith call location information or other information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with subsection (a) or any rules promulgated under this section.(f) If an order of protection is issued, but a separate order under § 36-3-606(a)(12) did not issue at the time of the order, or if the order of protection was issued prior to the availability of the relief under § 36-3-606(a)(12), a petitioner may, at any time, petition the court issuing the order of protection to modify the order and require a wireless service provider to transfer the billing responsibility for and rights to the wireless telephone number or numbers to the petitioner pursuant to this section.

(a) Upon issuance of an order of protection that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), the order shall include on its face the following disclosures:

(1) That the respondent is required to dispossess the respondent by any lawful means, such as transferring possession to a third party who is not prohibited from possessing firearms, of all firearms the respondent possesses within forty-eight (48) hours of the issuance of the order;

(2) That the respondent is prohibited from possessing a firearm for so long as the order of protection or any successive order of protection is in effect, and may reassume possession of the dispossessed firearm at such time as the order expires or is otherwise no longer in effect; and

(3) Notice of the penalty for any violation of this section and § 39-17-1307(f).

(b) The court shall then order and instruct the respondent:

(1) To terminate the respondent’s physical possession of the firearms in the respondent’s possession by any lawful means, such as transferring possession to a third party who is not prohibited from possessing firearms, within forty-eight (48) hours;

(2) To complete and return the affidavit of firearm dispossession form created pursuant to subsection (e), which the court may provide the respondent or direct the respondent to the administrative office of the courts’ website; and

(3) That if the respondent possesses firearms as business inventory or that are registered under the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. §§ 5801 et seq.), there are additional statutory provisions that may apply and shall include these additional provisions in the content of the order.

(c) Upon issuance of the order of protection, its provisions and date and time of issuance shall be transmitted to the sheriff and all local law enforcement agencies in the county where the respondent resides.

(d) When the respondent is lawfully dispossessed of firearms as required by this section, the respondent shall complete an affidavit of firearms dispossession form created pursuant to subsection (e) and return it to the court issuing the order of protection.

(e) The affidavit of firearms dispossession form shall be developed by the domestic violence state coordinating council, in consultation with the administrative office of the courts. Upon completion, the form shall be posted on the website of the administrative office of the courts where it can be copied by respondents or provided to them by the court or the court clerk.

(f) In determining what a lawful means of dispossession is:

(1) If the dispossession, including, but not limited to, the transfer of weapons registered under the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. §§ 5801 et seq.), that requires the approval of any state or federal agency prior to the transfer of the firearm, the respondent may comply with the dispossession requirement by having the firearm or firearms placed into a safe or similar container that is securely locked and to which the respondent does not have the combination, keys or other means of normal access;

(2) If the respondent is licensed as a federal firearms dealer or a responsible party under a federal firearms license, the determination of whether such an individual possesses firearms that constitute business inventory under the federal license shall be determined based upon the applicable federal statutes or the rules, regulations and official letters, rulings and publications of the bureau of alcohol, tobacco, firearms and explosives. The order of protection shall not require the surrender or transfer of the inventory if there are one (1) or more individuals who are responsible parties under the federal license who are not the respondent subject to the order of protection.

(g) A firearm subject to this section shall not be forfeited as provided in § 39-17-1317, unless the possession of the firearm prior to the entry of the order of protection constituted an independent crime of which the respondent has been convicted or the firearms are abandoned by the respondent.

(h)(1) It is an offense for a person subject to an order of protection that fully complies with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) to knowingly fail to surrender or transfer all firearms the respondent possesses as required by this section.

(2) A violation of subdivision (h)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor and each violation shall constitute a separate offense.(3) If the violation of subdivision (h)(1) also constitutes a violation of § 39-13-113(h) or § 39-17-1307(f), the respondent may be charged and convicted under any or all such sections.

(a)(1) Notwithstanding § 36-3-608, a victim of a felony offense under title 39, chapter 13, part 1, 2, 3, or 5 may file a petition for a lifetime order of protection against the offender who was convicted of the offense.

(2) As used in this section, “victim” has the meaning given in § 40-38-203.

(b) A petition filed by an unemancipated person under eighteen (18) years of age must be signed by one (1) of that person’s parents or by that person’s guardian. The petition may also be signed by a caseworker at a not-for-profit organization that receives funds pursuant to title 71, chapter 6, part 2 for family violence and child abuse prevention and shelters; provided, however, that a petition signed by a caseworker may not be filed against the unemancipated minor’s parent or legal guardian. In such case, unless the court finds that the action would create a threat of serious harm to the minor, a copy of the petition and notice of hearing shall also be served on the parents of the minor child, or if the parents are not living together and jointly caring for the child, upon the primary residential parent. In cases before the juvenile court where the department of children’s services is a party or where a guardian ad litem has been appointed for the child by the juvenile court, the petition may be filed by the department or the guardian ad litem.

(c) Venue for a petition for an order of protection under this section, and all other matters relating to orders of protection, is in the county where the respondent resides or the county in which the offense occurred. If the respondent is not a resident of this state, the petition may be filed in the county where the petitioner resides.

(d) The court shall cause a copy of the petition and notice of the date set for the hearing on such petition to be served upon the respondent at least five (5) days prior to the hearing. The notice must advise the respondent that the respondent may be represented by counsel. In every case, unless the court finds that the action would create a threat of serious harm to the minor, when a petitioner is under eighteen (18) years of age, a copy of the petition, and notice of hearing must also be served on the parents of the minor child, or in the event that the parents are not living together and jointly caring for the child, upon the primary residential parent, pursuant to the requirements of this section.

(e) At the hearing on the petition, the court shall, if the petitioner has proved the respondent was convicted of an offense listed in subsection (a) and that the petitioner was the victim of the offense, issue a lifetime order of protection that remains in effect until the death of the petitioner or the respondent. If the petitioner has not provided proof that respondent was convicted of such an offense and that the petitioner was the victim of the offense, the court shall dismiss the petition.

(f) An order of protection granted under this section must:

(1) Prohibit the respondent from coming about the petitioner for any purpose, from telephoning, contacting, or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;

(2) Include a statement of the maximum penalty that may be imposed pursuant to § 36-3-610 for violating such order; and

(3) Be valid and enforceable in any county of this state.

(g) A lifetime order of protection is effective and must be served as provided in § 36-3-609.

(h)(1) Upon violation of a lifetime order of protection, the court may hold the defendant in civil or criminal contempt and, following a contempt hearing as provided in § 36-3-612, punish the defendant in accordance with the law. A judge of the general sessions court has the same power as a court of record to punish the defendant for contempt when exercising jurisdiction pursuant to this part or when exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a court of record. A judge of the general sessions court who is not a licensed attorney shall appoint an attorney referee to hear charges of criminal contempt.

(2) In addition to the authorized punishments for contempt of court, the judge may assess any person who violates a lifetime order of protection a civil penalty of fifty dollars ($50.00). The judge may further order that any support payment made pursuant to an order of protection or a court-approved consent agreement be made under an income assignment to the clerk of court. Upon collecting the civil penalty imposed by this subdivision (h)(2), the clerk shall, on a monthly basis, send the money to the state treasurer who shall deposit it in the domestic violence community education fund created by § 36-3-616.

(i) An arrest for violation of a lifetime order of protection issued pursuant to this section may be with or without warrant. A law enforcement officer shall arrest the respondent without a warrant if:

(1) The officer has proper jurisdiction over the area in which the violation occurred;

(2) The officer has reasonable cause to believe the respondent has violated or is in violation of a lifetime order for protection; and(3) The officer has verified whether a lifetime order of protection is in effect against the respondent. If necessary, the officer may verify the existence of a lifetime order for protection by telephone or radio communication with the appropriate law enforcement agency.

(a)(1) Except as provided in subsection (b), a person who has been convicted of aggravated rape pursuant to § 39-13-502, rape pursuant to § 39-13-503, rape of a child pursuant to § 39-13-522, aggravated statutory rape pursuant to § 39-13-506, or statutory rape by an authority figure pursuant to § 39-13-532, from which crime a child was conceived shall not have custody or visitation rights, or the rights of inheritance with respect to that child.

(2) A person who is originally charged with an offense listed in subdivision (a)(1), but is convicted of or pleads guilty or no contest to a lesser included offense, from which crime a child was conceived shall not have custody or visitation rights, or the rights of inheritance with respect to that child.

(b) The other parent of the child may waive the protection afforded under subsection (a) regarding visitation and request that the court grant reasonable visitation rights with the child if paternity has been acknowledged.(c) Unless waived by the other parent and, if contributing toward support of the child, the department of human services, a court shall establish a child support obligation against the father of the child pursuant to chapter 5, part 1 of this title.

(a) This section shall be known and may be cited as the “Protective Parent Reform Act.”

(b) If a parent makes a good faith allegation based on a reasonable belief supported by facts that the child is the victim of child abuse, child neglect, or the effects of domestic violence, and if that parent acts lawfully and in good faith in response to that reasonable belief to protect the child or seek treatment for the child, then that parent shall not be deprived of custody, visitation, or contact with the child, or restricted in custody, visitation, or contact, based solely on that belief or the reasonable actions taken based on that belief.

(c)(1) If an allegation that a child is abused is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, then the court shall consider such evidence of abuse in determining the visitation arrangement that is in the best interest of the child, and the court shall not place a child in the custody of a parent who presents a substantial risk of harm to that child.

(2) A parent is presumed to present a substantial risk of harm to the child if the parent is under indictment for the offense of aggravated child abuse under § 39-15-402, child sexual abuse under § 37-1-602, or severe child sexual abuse under § 36-1-113(g)(11). The parent shall remain a risk of harm during the pendency of the indictment; provided, however, that the court may grant the parent supervised visitation with the child.

(a) Any of the following circumstances, when presented in a petition for grandparent visitation to the circuit, chancery, general sessions courts with domestic relations jurisdiction, other courts with domestic relations jurisdiction or juvenile court in matters involving children born out of wedlock of the county in which the petitioned child currently resides, necessitates a hearing if such grandparent visitation is opposed by the custodial parent or parents or custodian or if the grandparent visitation has been severely reduced by the custodial parent or parents or custodian:

(1) The father or mother of an unmarried minor child is deceased;

(2) The child’s father or mother are divorced, legally separated, or were never married to each other;

(3) The child’s father or mother has been missing for not less than six (6) months;

(4) The court of another state has ordered grandparent visitation;

(5) The child resided in the home of the grandparent for a period of twelve (12) months or more and was subsequently removed from the home by the parent, parents, or custodian (this grandparent-grandchild relationship establishes a rebuttable presumption that denial of visitation may result in irreparable harm to the child); or

(6) The child and the grandparent maintained a significant existing relationship for a period of twelve (12) months or more immediately preceding severance or severe reduction of the relationship, this relationship was severed or severely reduced by the parent, parents, or custodian for reasons other than abuse or presence of a danger of substantial harm to the child, and severance or severe reduction of this relationship is likely to occasion substantial emotional harm to the child.

(b)(1) In considering a petition for grandparent visitation, the court shall first determine the presence of a danger of substantial harm to the child. Such finding of substantial harm may be based upon cessation or severe reduction of the relationship between an unmarried minor child and the child’s grandparent if the court determines, upon proper proof, that:

(A) The child had such a significant existing relationship with the grandparent that loss or severe reduction of the relationship is likely to occasion severe emotional harm to the child;

(B) The grandparent functioned as a primary caregiver such that cessation or severe reduction of the relationship could interrupt provision of the daily needs of the child and thus occasion physical or emotional harm; or

(C) The child had a significant existing relationship with the grandparent and loss or severe reduction of the relationship presents the danger of other direct and substantial harm to the child.

(2) For purposes of this section, a grandparent shall be deemed to have a significant existing relationship with a grandchild if:

(A) The child resided with the grandparent for at least six (6) consecutive months;

(B) The grandparent was a full-time caretaker of the child for a period of not less than six (6) consecutive months; or

(C) The grandparent had frequent visitation with the child who is the subject of the suit for a period of not less than one (1) year.

(3) A grandparent is not required to present the testimony or affidavit of an expert witness in order to establish a significant existing relationship with a grandchild or that the loss or severe reduction of the relationship is likely to occasion severe emotional harm to the child. Instead, the court shall consider whether the facts of the particular case would lead a reasonable person to believe that there is a significant existing relationship between the grandparent and grandchild or that the loss or severe reduction of the relationship is likely to occasion severe emotional harm to the child.

(4) For the purposes of this section, if the child’s parent is deceased and the grandparent seeking visitation is the parent of that deceased parent, there shall be a rebuttable presumption of substantial harm to the child based upon the cessation or severe reduction of the relationship between the child and grandparent.

(c) Upon an initial finding of danger of substantial harm to the child, the court shall then determine whether grandparent visitation would be in the best interests of the child based upon the factors in § 36-6-307. Upon such determination, reasonable visitation may be ordered.

(d)(1) Notwithstanding § 36-1-121, if a relative or stepparent adopts a child, this section applies.

(2) If a person other than a relative or a stepparent adopts a child, any visitation rights granted pursuant to this section before the adoption of the child shall automatically end upon such adoption.

(e) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, as used in this part, with regard to the petitioned child, the word “grandparent” includes, but is not limited to:

(1) A biological grandparent;

(2) The spouse of a biological grandparent;

(3) A parent of an adoptive parent; or

(4) A biological or adoptive great-grandparent or the spouse thereof.

(f) For purposes of this section, “severe reduction” or “severely reduced” means reduction to no contact or token visitation as defined in § 36-1-102.

(a) The permanent parenting plan and the mechanism for approval of the permanent parenting plan shall not utilize dispute resolution, and a parent’s residential time as provided in the permanent parenting plan or temporary parenting plan shall be limited if the limitation is found to be in the best interest of the minor child and if the court determines, based upon a prior order or other reliable evidence, that a parent has engaged in any of the following conduct:

(1) Willful abandonment that continues for an extended period of time or substantial refusal to perform parenting responsibilities; or

(2) Physical or sexual abuse or a pattern of emotional abuse of the parent, child or of another person living with that child as defined in § 36-3-601.

(b) The parent’s residential time with the child shall be limited if it is determined by the court, based upon a prior order or other reliable evidence, that the parent resides with a person who has engaged in physical or sexual abuse or a pattern of emotional abuse of the parent, child or of another person living with that child as defined in § 36-3-601.

(c) If a parent has been convicted as an adult of a sexual offense under § 39-15-302, title 39, chapter 17, part 10, or §§ 39-13-501 – 39-13-511, or has been found to be a sexual offender under title 39, chapter 13, part 7, the court shall restrain the parent from contact with a child that would otherwise be allowed under this part. If a parent resides with an adult who has been convicted, or with a juvenile who has been adjudicated guilty of a sexual offense under § 39-15-302, title 39, chapter 17, part 10, or §§ 39-13-501 – 39-13-511, or who has been found to be a sexual offender under title 39, chapter 13, part 7, the court shall restrain that parent from contact with the child unless the contact occurs outside the adult’s or juvenile’s presence and sufficient provisions are established to protect the child.

(d) A parent’s involvement or conduct may have an adverse effect on the child’s best interest, and the court may preclude or limit any provisions of a parenting plan, if any of the following limiting factors are found to exist after a hearing:

(1) A parent’s neglect or substantial nonperformance of parenting responsibilities;

(2) An emotional or physical impairment that interferes with the parent’s performance of parenting responsibilities as defined in § 36-6-402;

(3) An impairment resulting from drug, alcohol, or other substance abuse that interferes with the performance of parenting responsibilities;

(4) The absence or substantial impairment of emotional ties between the parent and the child;

(5) The abusive use of conflict by the parent that creates the danger of damage to the child’s psychological development;

(6) A parent has withheld from the other parent access to the child for a protracted period without good cause;

(7) A parent’s criminal convictions as they relate to such parent’s ability to parent or to the welfare of the child; or

(8) Such other factors or conduct as the court expressly finds adverse to the best interests of the child.

(e) In entering a permanent parenting plan, the court shall not draw any presumptions from the temporary parenting plan.

(f)(1) In all Title IV-D child or spousal support cases in which payment of support is to be made by income assignment, or otherwise, and in all cases where payments made by income assignment based upon support orders entered on or after January 1, 1994, that are not Title IV-D support cases but must be made to the central collection and disbursement unit as provided by § 36-5-116, and, except as may otherwise be allowed by § 36-5-501(a)(2)(B), the court shall only approve a temporary or permanent parenting plan involving the payment of support that complies with the requirements for central collection and disbursement as required by § 36-5-116. Prior to approval of a parenting plan in which payments are to be made directly to the spouse or the court clerk or to some other person or entity, there shall be filed with the plan presented to the court a written certification, under oath if filed by a party, or signed by the party’s counsel, stating whether the case for which the plan is to be approved is a Title IV-D support case subject to enforcement by the department of human services or is otherwise subject to collection through the department’s central collection and disbursement unit established by § 36-5-116.

(2) Any provision of any parenting plan, agreement or court order providing for any other payment procedure contrary to the requirements of § 36-5-116, except as may otherwise be allowed by § 36-5-501(a)(2)(B), whether or not approved by the court, shall be void and of no effect. No credit for support payments shall be given by the court, the court clerk or the department of human services for child or spousal support payments required by the support order that are made in contravention of such requirements; provided, however, the department may make any necessary adjustments to the balances owed to account for changes in the Title IV-D or central collection and disbursement status of the support case.

(g) Forms used by parties as parenting plans or adopted by the court for their use shall conform to all substantive language requirements established by the administrative office of the courts at such time as parenting plan forms1 are promulgated and approved by that office.

(a) For purposes of this part and §§ 8-7-109, 37-1-152, 37-1-403, 37-1-406, 37-1-413 and 49-7-117, unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) “Child care agency” is as defined in §§ 71-3-501 and 37-5-501;

(2) “Child protection team” means the investigation team created by § 37-1-607;

(3)(A) “Child sexual abuse” means the commission of any act involving the unlawful sexual abuse, molestation, fondling or carnal knowledge of a child under thirteen (13) years of age that prior to November 1, 1989, constituted the criminal offense of:

(i) Aggravated rape under § 39-2-603 [repealed];

(ii) Aggravated sexual battery under § 39-2-606 [repealed];

(iii) Assault with intent to commit rape or attempt to commit rape or sexual battery under § 39-2-608 [repealed];

(iv) Begetting child on wife’s sister under § 39-4-307 [repealed];

(v) Crimes against nature under § 39-2-612 [repealed];

(vi) Incest under § 39-4-306 [repealed];

(vii) Promotion of performance including sexual conduct by minor under § 39-6-1138 [repealed];

(viii) Rape under § 39-2-604 [repealed];

(ix) Sexual battery under § 39-2-607 [repealed]; or

(x) Use of minor for obscene purposes under § 39-6-1137 [repealed];

(B) “Child sexual abuse” also means the commission of any act involving the unlawful sexual abuse, molestation, fondling or carnal knowledge of a child under thirteen (13) years of age that on or after November 1, 1989, constituted the criminal offense of:

(i) Aggravated rape under § 39-13-502;

(ii) Aggravated sexual battery under § 39-13-504;

(iii) Aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor under § 39-17-1004;

(iv) Criminal attempt as provided in § 39-12-101 for any of the offenses in (a)(3)(B)(i)-(iii);

(v) Especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor under § 39-17-1005;

(vi) Incest under § 39-15-302;

(vii) Rape under § 39-13-503;

(viii) Sexual battery under § 39-13-505; or

(ix) Sexual exploitation of a minor under § 39-17-1003;

(C) “Child sexual abuse” also means one (1) or more of the following acts:

(i) Any penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anal opening of one (1) person by the penis of another person, whether or not there is the emission of semen;

(ii) Any contact between the genitals or anal opening of one (1) person and the mouth or tongue of another person;

(iii) Any intrusion by one (1) person into the genitals or anal opening of another person, including the use of any object for this purpose, except that it shall not include acts intended for a valid medical purpose;

(iv) The intentional touching of the genitals or intimate parts, including the breasts, genital area, groin, inner thighs, and buttocks, or the clothing covering them, of either the child or the perpetrator, except that it shall not include:

(a) Acts that may reasonably be construed to be normal caretaker responsibilities, interactions with, or affection for a child; or

(b) Acts intended for a valid medical purpose;

(v) The intentional exposure of the perpetrator’s genitals in the presence of a child, or any other sexual act intentionally perpetrated in the presence of a child, if such exposure or sexual act is for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, aggression, degradation, or other similar purpose;

(vi) The sexual exploitation of a child, which includes allowing, encouraging, or forcing a child to:

(a) Solicit for or engage in prostitution; or

(b) Engage in an act prohibited by § 39-17-1003;

(vii) The commission of any act towards the child prohibited by § 39-13-309; and

(D) For the purposes of the reporting, investigation, and treatment provisions of §§ 37-1-603 – 37-1-615 “child sexual abuse” also means the commission of any act specified in subdivisions (a)(3)(A)-(C) against a child thirteen (13) years of age through seventeen (17) years of age if such act is committed against the child by a parent, guardian, relative, person residing in the child’s home, or other person responsible for the care and custody of the child;

(4) “Department” means the department of children’s services;

(5) “Guardian ad litem” means a responsible adult who is appointed by the court to represent the best interests of a child in a proceeding as provided for by law, who shall be a party to any judicial proceeding as a representative of the child, and who shall serve until discharged by the court;

(6) “Institutional child sexual abuse” means situations of known or suspected child sexual abuse in which the person allegedly perpetrating the child sexual abuse is an employee of a public or private child care agency, public or private school, or any other person responsible for the child’s care;

(7) “Mental injury” means an injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernible and substantial impairment in the child’s ability to function within the child’s normal range of performance and behavior, with due regard to the child’s culture; and

(8) “Other person responsible for a child’s care or welfare” includes, but is not limited to, the child’s legal guardian, legal custodian, or foster parent; an employee of a public or private child care agency, public or private school; or any other person legally responsible for the child’s welfare in a residential setting.

(b) Harm to a child’s health or welfare can occur when the parent or other person responsible for the child’s welfare:

(1) Commits, or allows to be committed, child sexual abuse as defined in subdivisions (a)(3)(A)-(C); or

(2) Exploits a child under eighteen (18) years of age, or allows such child to be exploited, as provided in §§ 39-17-1003 – 39-17-1005.

(a) A person commits assault who:

(1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another;

(2) Intentionally or knowingly causes another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury; or

(3) Intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another and a reasonable person would regard the contact as extremely offensive or provocative.

(b)(1) Assault under:

(A) Subdivision (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor, punishable by incarceration and a fine not to exceed fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000);

(B) Subdivision (a)(2) is a Class A misdemeanor; and

(C) Subdivision (a)(3) is a Class B misdemeanor.

(2) Any conduct by an inmate against a correctional officer, guard, jailer, or other full-time employee of a penal institution, local jail, or workhouse, that would constitute an assault under subdivision (a)(1) shall be reported by the managing authority of the institution to the appropriate district attorney general for prosecution.

(3) In addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for a violation of this section, if the relationship between the defendant and the victim of the assault is such that the victim is a domestic abuse victim as defined in § 36-3-601 , and if, as determined by the court, the defendant possesses the ability to pay a fine in an amount not in excess of two hundred dollars ($200), then the court shall impose a fine at the level of the defendant’s ability to pay, but no less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not in excess of two hundred dollars ($200). The additional fine shall be paid to the clerk of the court imposing sentence, who shall transfer it to the state treasurer, who shall credit the fine to the general fund. All fines so credited to the general fund shall be subject to appropriation by the general assembly for the exclusive purpose of funding family violence shelters and shelter services. Such appropriation shall be in addition to any amount appropriated pursuant to § 67-4-411.

(c) For purposes of this section and § 39-13-102, “health care provider” means a person who is licensed, certified or otherwise authorized or permitted by the laws of this state to administer health care in the ordinary course of business in the practicing of a profession.

(a)(1) A person commits the offense of indecent exposure who:

(A) In a public place, as defined in § 39-11-106, or on the private premises of another, or so near thereto as to be seen from the private premises:

(i) Intentionally:

(a) Exposes the person’s genitals or buttocks to another; or

(b) Engages in sexual contact or sexual penetration as defined in § 39-13-501; and

(ii) Reasonably expects that the acts will be viewed by another and the acts:

(a) Will offend an ordinary viewer; or

(b) Are for the purpose of sexual arousal and gratification of the defendant; or

(B)(i) Knowingly invites, entices or fraudulently induces the child of another into the person’s residence for the purpose of attaining sexual arousal or gratification by intentionally engaging in the following conduct in the presence of the child:

(a) Exposure of such person’s genitals, buttocks or female breasts; or

(b) Masturbation; or

(ii) Knowingly engages in the person’s own residence, in the intended presence of any child, for the defendant’s sexual arousal or gratification the following intentional conduct:

(a) Exposure of the person’s genitals, buttocks or female breasts; or

(b) Masturbation.

(2) No prosecution shall be commenced for a violation of subdivision (a)(1)(B)(ii)(a) based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of a witness who shares with the accused any of the relationships described in § 36-3-601(5).

(3) For subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i) or (a)(1)(B)(ii) to apply, the defendant must be eighteen (18) years of age or older and the child victim must be less than thirteen (13) years of age.

(b)(1) “Indecent exposure”, as defined in subsection (a), is a Class B misdemeanor, unless subdivision (b)(2), (b)(3) or (b)(4) applies.

(2) If the defendant is eighteen (18) years of age or older and the victim is under thirteen (13) years of age, indecent exposure is a Class A misdemeanor.

(3) If the defendant is eighteen (18) years of age or older and the victim is under thirteen (13) years of age, and the defendant has any combination of two (2) or more prior convictions under this section or § 39-13-517, or is a sexual offender, violent sexual offender or violent juvenile sexual offender, as defined in § 40-39-202, the offense is a Class E felony.

(4) If the defendant is eighteen (18) years of age or older and the victim is under thirteen (13) years of age, and the offense occurs on the property of any public school, private or parochial school, licensed day care center or other child care facility during a time at which a child or children are likely to be present on the property, the offense is a Class E felony.

(c)(1) A person confined in a penal institution, as defined in § 39-16-601, commits the offense of indecent exposure who with the intent to abuse, torment, harass or embarrass a guard:

(A) Intentionally exposes the person’s genitals or buttocks to the guard; or

(B) Engages in sexual contact as defined in § 39-13-501.

(2) For purposes of this subsection (c), “guard” means any sheriff, jailer, guard, correctional officer or other authorized personnel charged with the custody of the person.

(3) Notwithstanding subsection (b), a violation of this subsection (c) is a Class A misdemeanor.

(d) This section does not apply to a mother who is breastfeeding her child in any location, public or private.

(a) A person commits an offense under this section who engages in prostitution.

(b)(1) Prostitution is a Class B misdemeanor.

(2) Prostitution committed within one hundred feet (100′) of a church or within one and one-half (1 ½ ) miles of a school, such distance being that established by § 49-6-2101, for state-funded school transportation, is a Class A misdemeanor.

(3) A person convicted of prostitution within one and one-half (1 ½ ) miles of a school shall, in addition to any other authorized punishment, be sentenced to at least seven (7) days of incarceration and be fined at least one thousand dollars ($1,000).

(c) As used in subsection (b), “school” means all public and private schools that conduct classes in any grade from kindergarten through grade twelve (K-12).

(d) Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, if it is determined after a reasonable detention for investigative purposes, that a person suspected of or charged with a violation of this section is under eighteen (18) years of age, that person is immune from prosecution for prostitution as a juvenile or adult. A law enforcement officer who takes a person under eighteen (18) years of age into custody for a suspected violation of this section shall, upon determination that the person is a minor, provide the minor with the telephone number for the Tennessee human trafficking resource center hotline, notify the department of children’s services, and release the minor to the custody of a parent or legal guardian or transport the minor to a shelter care facility designated by the juvenile court judge to facilitate the release of the minor to the custody of a parent or legal guardian.(e) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that a person charged with a violation of this section was so charged for conduct that occurred because the person was a victim of an act committed in violation of § 39-13-307 or § 39-13-309, or because the person was a victim as defined under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (22 U.S.C. § 7102).

(a) A person commits an offense under this section:

(1) Who promotes prostitution; or

(2) Who promotes prostitution where the subject of the offense is a law enforcement officer or is a law enforcement officer eighteen (18) years of age or older posing as a minor.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), promoting prostitution is a Class E felony.

(c) Promoting prostitution of a person more than twelve (12) years of age but less than eighteen (18) years of age or a person with an intellectual disability as defined in § 33-1-101 is a Class A felony.

(d) It is not a defense to a violation of this section that:

(1) The subject of the offense is a law enforcement officer;

(2) The victim of the offense is a minor and consented to the offense; or

(3) The solicitation was unsuccessful, the conduct solicited was not engaged in, or a law enforcement officer could not engage in the solicited offense.

(a) As used in this section:

(1) “Nudity” or “state of nudity” means the showing of the bare human male or female genitals or pubic area with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of the areola, or the showing of the covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state. Nudity or state of nudity does not include a mother in the act of nursing the mother’s baby; and

(2)(A)(i) “Public place” means any location frequented by the public, or where the public is present or likely to be present, or where a person may reasonably be expected to be observed by members of the public. Public place includes, but is not limited to, streets, sidewalks, parks, beaches, business and commercial establishments, whether for profit or not-for-profit and whether open to the public at large or where entrance is limited by a cover charge or membership requirement, bottle clubs, hotels, motels, restaurants, night clubs, country clubs, cabarets and meeting facilities utilized by any religious, social, fraternal or similar organizations;

(ii) For purposes of subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2), “public place” includes a public restroom, whether single sex or not;

(B) Premises used solely as a private residence, whether permanent or temporary in nature, are not deemed to be a public place. Public place does not include enclosed single sex functional showers, locker or dressing room facilities, enclosed motel rooms and hotel rooms designed and intended for sleeping accommodations, doctors’ offices, portions of hospitals and similar places in which nudity or exposure is necessarily and customarily expected outside of the home and the sphere of privacy constitutionally protected therein; nor does it include a person appearing in a state of nudity in a modeling class operated by a proprietary school, licensed by this state, a college, junior college, or university supported entirely or partly by taxation, or a private college or university where such private college or university maintains and operates educational programs in which credits are transferable to a college, junior college, or university supported entirely or partly by taxation or an accredited private college. Public place does not include a private facility that has been formed as a family-oriented clothing optional facility, properly licensed by the state.

(b) A person commits the offense of public indecency who, in a public place, knowingly or intentionally:

(1) Engages in sexual intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation, flagellation, or other ultimate sex acts;

(2) Fondles the genitals of the person, or another person; or

(3) Appears in a state of nudity or performs an excretory function.

(c) A person does not violate subsection (b) if the person makes intentional and reasonable attempts to conceal the person from public view while performing an excretory function, and the person performs the function in an unincorporated area of the state.

(d) Public indecency is punishable as follows:

(1) A first or second offense is a Class B misdemeanor punishable only by a fine of five hundred dollars ($500) unless otherwise specified under subdivision (d)(3);

(2) Unless subdivision (d)(3) applies, a third or subsequent offense is a Class A misdemeanor punishable by a fine of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) or confinement for not more than eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days, or both; and

(3)(A) Notwithstanding subdivisions (d)(1) and (2), where the offense involves the defendant engaging in masturbation by self-stimulation, or the use of an inanimate object, on the property of any public school, private or parochial school, licensed day care center, or other child care facility, and the defendant knows or reasonably should know that a child or children are likely to be present on the property at the time of the conduct, the offense is a Class E felony;

(B) Where a person is charged with a violation under subdivision (d)(3)(A), and the court grants judicial diversion under § 40-35-313, the court shall order, as a condition of probation, that the person be enrolled in a satellite-based monitoring program for the full extent of the person’s term of probation, in a manner consistent with the requirements of § 40-39-302.

(e) If a person is arrested for public indecency while working as an employee or a contractor, the employer or principal may be held liable for a fine imposed by subdivision (d); provided, however, the employer may not be held liable under this section unless it is shown the employer knew or should have known the acts of the employee or contractor were in violation of this section.

(f) This section does not apply to any theatrical production that contains nudity performed in a theater by a professional or amateur theatrical or musical company that has serious artistic merit; provided, that the production is not in violation of chapter 17, part 9 of this title.

(g) This section shall not affect in any fashion the ability of local jurisdictions or this state to regulate any activity where alcoholic beverages, including malt beverages, are sold for consumption.

(a) It is an offense for a person eighteen (18) years of age or older, by means of oral, written or electronic communication, electronic mail or internet services, directly or through another, to intentionally command, request, hire, persuade, invite or attempt to induce a person whom the person making the solicitation knows, or should know, is less than eighteen (18) years of age, or solicits a law enforcement officer posing as a minor, and whom the person making the solicitation reasonably believes to be less than eighteen (18) years of age, to engage in conduct that, if completed, would constitute a violation by the soliciting adult of one (1) or more of the following offenses:

(1) Rape of a child, pursuant to § 39-13-522;

(2) Aggravated rape, pursuant to § 39-13-502;

(3) Rape, pursuant to § 39-13-503;

(4) Aggravated sexual battery, pursuant to § 39-13-504;

(5) Sexual battery by an authority figure, pursuant to § 39-13-527;

(6) Sexual battery, pursuant to § 39-13-505;

(7) Statutory rape, pursuant to § 39-13-506;

(8) Especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, pursuant to § 39-17-1005;

(9) Sexual activity involving a minor, pursuant to § 39-13-529;

(10) Trafficking for commercial sex acts, pursuant to § 39-13-309;

(11) Patronizing prostitution, pursuant to § 39-13-514;

(12) Promoting prostitution, pursuant to § 39-13-515; or

(13) Aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, pursuant to § 39-17-1004.

(b) It is no defense that the solicitation was unsuccessful, that the conduct solicited was not engaged in, or that the law enforcement officer could not engage in the solicited offense. It is no defense that the minor solicited was unaware of the criminal nature of the conduct solicited.

(c) A violation of this section shall constitute an offense one (1) classification lower than the most serious crime solicited, unless the offense solicited was a Class E felony, in which case the offense shall be a Class A misdemeanor.

(d) A person is subject to prosecution in this state under this section for any conduct that originates in this state, or for any conduct that originates by a person located outside this state, where the person solicited the conduct of a minor located in this state, or solicited a law enforcement officer posing as a minor located within this state.

(a) Aggravated rape of a child is the unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant or the defendant by a victim, if the victim is eight (8) years of age or less.

(b) Aggravated rape of a child is a Class A felony and shall be punished as follows:

(1) If the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the commission of the offense, then the sentence must be from within Range III, as set forth in title 40, chapter 35; and

(2) If the defendant was an adult at the time of the commission of the offense, then the sentencing provisions of title 40, chapter 35, apply except:

(A) A sentencing hearing shall not be conducted as required by § 40-35-209; and(B) After a defendant is found guilty of aggravated rape of a child, the judge shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole.

(a) A person commits the offense of promoting travel for prostitution if the person sells or offers to sell travel services that the person knows to include travel for the purpose of engaging in what would be prostitution if occurring in the state.

(b) “Travel services” means, but is not limited to, transportation by air, sea, road or rail, related ground transportation, hotel accommodations, or package tours, whether offered on a wholesale or retail basis.

(c) Promoting travel for prostitution is a Class D felony.

(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit prosecution under any other law.

(a)(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in §§ 39-13-601–39-13-603 and title 40, chapter 6, part 3, a person commits an offense who:
 

(A) Intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication;
 

(B) Intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when:
 

(i) The device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or other like connection used in wire communication; or
 

(ii) The device transmits communications by radio, or interferes with the transmission of the communication;
 

(C) Intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection (a); or
 

(D) Intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know, that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral or electronic communication in violation of this subsection (a).
 

(2) A violation of subdivision (a)(1) shall be punished as provided in § 39-13-602 and shall be subject to suit as provided in § 39-13-603.
 

(b)(1) It is lawful under §§ 39-13-601–39-13-603 and title 40, chapter 6, part 3 for an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communications service, or a telecommunications company, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire communication, to intercept, disclose or use that communication in the normal course of employment while engaged in any activity that is necessary to the rendition of service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service. Nothing in §§ 39-13-601–39-13-603 and title 40, chapter 6, part 3 shall be construed to prohibit a telecommunications or other company from engaging in service observing for the purpose of maintaining service quality standards for the benefit of consumers.
 

(2) Notwithstanding any other law, providers of wire or electronic communications service, their officers, employees, or agents, landlords, custodians, or other persons are authorized to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance to persons authorized by law to intercept wire, oral, or electronic communications, if the provider, its officers, employees, or agents, landlord, custodian or other specified person has been provided with a court order signed by the authorizing judge of competent jurisdiction that:
 

(A) Directs the assistance;
 

(B) Sets forth a period of time during which the provision of the information, facilities, or technical assistance is authorized; and
 

(C) Specifies the information, facilities, or technical assistance required.
 

(3) No provider of wire or electronic communications service, officer, employee, or agent thereof, or landlord, custodian or other specified person shall disclose the existence of any interception or surveillance or the device used to accomplish the interception or surveillance with respect to which the person has been furnished a court order, except as may otherwise be required by legal process, and then only after prior notification to the attorney general and reporter or to the district attorney general or any political subdivision of a district, as may be appropriate. Any such disclosure shall render the person liable for the civil damages provided for in § 39-13-603. No cause of action shall lie in any court against any provider of wire or electronic communications service, its officers, employees, or agents, landlord, custodian, or other specified person for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order under §§ 39-13-601 – 39-13-603 and title 40, chapter 6, part 3.
 

(4) It is lawful under §§ 39-13-601 – 39-13-603 and title 40, chapter 6, part 3 for a person acting under the color of law to intercept a wire, oral or electronic communication, where the person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.
 

(5) It is lawful under §§ 39-13-601 – 39-13-603 and title 40, chapter 6, part 3 for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where the person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception, unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the constitution or laws of this state.
 

(6) It is unlawful to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communication for the purpose of committing a criminal act.
 

(7) It is lawful, unless otherwise prohibited by state or federal law, for any person:
 

(A) To intercept or access an electronic communication made through an electronic communication system that is configured so that the electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public;
 

(B) To intercept any radio communication that is transmitted by:
 

(i) Any station for the use of the general public, or that relates to ships, aircraft, vehicles, or persons in distress;
 

(ii) Any governmental, law enforcement, civil defense, private land mobile, or public safety communications system, including police and fire, readily accessible to the general public;
 

(iii) Any station operating on an authorized frequency within the bands allocated to the amateur, citizens band, or general mobile radio services; or
 

(iv) Any marine or aeronautical communications system;
 

(C) To intercept any wire or electronic communication, the transmission of which is causing harmful interference with any lawfully operating station or consumer electronic equipment, to the extent necessary to identify the source of such interference; or
 

(D) For other users of the same frequency to intercept any radio communication made through a system that utilizes frequencies monitored by individuals engaged in the provision or the use of such system, if such communication is not scrambled or encrypted.
 

(c)(1) Except as provided in subdivision (c)(2), a person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not intentionally divulge the contents of any communication, other than one to such person or entity, or an agent thereof, while in transmission on that service to any person or entity other than an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient.
 

(2) A person or entity providing electronic communication service to the public may divulge the contents of any such communication:
 

(A) As otherwise authorized in subdivisions (b)(1)-(3) or § 40-6-306;
 

(B) With the lawful consent of the originator or any addressee or intended recipient of such communication;
 

(C) To a person employed or authorized, or whose facilities are used, to forward such communication to its destination; or
 

(D) That were inadvertently obtained by the service provider and which appear to pertain to the commission of a crime, if the divulgence is made to a law enforcement agency.
 

(d) Notwithstanding any provision of this part to the contrary, this section shall not apply to a person who installs software on a computer the person owns if such software is intended solely to monitor and record the use of the internet by a minor child of whom such person is a parent or legal guardian.

(a)(1)(A) Except as provided in subsection (b), it is an offense for a person to knowingly install, conceal or otherwise place an electronic tracking device in or on a motor vehicle without the consent of all owners of the vehicle for the purpose of monitoring or following an occupant or occupants of the vehicle.

(B) It is an offense for a person who leases a motor vehicle to knowingly install, conceal, or otherwise place an electronic tracking device in or on the motor vehicle without the consent of the lessee of the vehicle.

(2) As used in this section:

(A) “Lease” has the same meaning as defined in § 39-14-147;

(B) “Owner” includes a person who has purchased a motor vehicle using a loan; and

(C) “Person” does not include the manufacturer of the motor vehicle.

(b)(1) It shall not be a violation if the installing, concealing or placing of an electronic tracking device in or on a motor vehicle is by, or at the direction of, a law enforcement officer in furtherance of a criminal investigation and is carried out in accordance with applicable state and federal law.

(2) If the installing, concealing or placing of an electronic tracking device in or on a motor vehicle is by, or at the direction of, a parent or legal guardian who owns or leases the vehicle, and if the device is used solely for the purpose of monitoring the minor child of the parent or legal guardian when the child is an occupant of the vehicle, then the installation, concealment or placement of the device in or on the vehicle without the consent of any or all occupants in the vehicle shall not be a violation.

(3) It shall also not be a violation of this section if the installing, concealing or placing of an electronic tracking device in or on a motor vehicle is for the purpose of tracking the location of stolen goods being transported in the vehicle or for the purpose of tracking the location of the vehicle if it is stolen.

(c) This section shall not apply to a tracking system installed by the manufacturer of a motor vehicle.

(d) A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

(a) A person commits the offense of aggravated unlawful photographing when the person knowingly photographs, or causes to be photographed a minor, when the minor has a reasonable expectation of privacy, if the photograph:
 

(1) Depicts the minor in a state of nudity; and
 

(2) Was taken for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of the defendant.
 

(b) As used in this section:
 

(1) “Nudity” has the meaning given in § 39-17-901; and
 

(2) “Photograph” has the meaning given in § 39-13-605.
 

(c) A violation of subsection (a) is a Class C felony.
 

(d) Nothing in this section shall preclude the state from electing to prosecute conduct in violation of this section under any other applicable section, including chapter 17, parts 9 and 10 of this title.

(a) A person commits the offense of aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect or aggravated child endangerment, who commits child abuse, as defined in § 39-15-401(a); child neglect, as defined in § 39-15-401(b); or child endangerment, as defined in § 39-15-401(c) and:

(1) The act of abuse, neglect or endangerment results in serious bodily injury to the child;

(2) A deadly weapon, dangerous instrumentality, controlled substance or controlled substance analogue is used to accomplish the act of abuse, neglect or endangerment;

(3) The act of abuse, neglect or endangerment was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, or involved the infliction of torture to the victim; or

(4) The act of abuse, neglect or endangerment results from the knowing exposure of a child to the initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine as described in § 39-17-435.

(b) A violation of this section is a Class B felony; provided, however, that, if the abused, neglected or endangered child is eight (8) years of age or less, or is vulnerable because the victim is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or suffers from a physical disability, the penalty is a Class A felony.

(c) “Serious bodily injury to the child” includes, but is not limited to, second- or third-degree burns, a fracture of any bone, a concussion, subdural or subarachnoid bleeding, retinal hemorrhage, cerebral edema, brain contusion, injuries to the skin that involve severe bruising or the likelihood of permanent or protracted disfigurement, including those sustained by whipping children with objects.

(d) A “dangerous instrumentality” is any item that, in the manner of its use or intended use as applied to a child, is capable of producing serious bodily injury to a child, as serious bodily injury to a child is defined in this section.

(e) This section shall be known and may be cited as “Haley’s Law”.

(f) The court may, in addition to any other punishment otherwise authorized by law, order a person convicted of aggravated child abuse to refrain from having any contact with the victim of the offense, including, but not limited to, attempted contact through internet services or social networking websites; provided, that the person has no parental rights to such victim at the time of the court’s order.

As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) “Abandonment” means the knowing desertion or forsaking of an elderly or vulnerable adult by a caregiver under circumstances in which there is a reasonable likelihood that physical harm could occur;

(2) “Abuse” means the infliction of physical harm;

(3) “Adult protective services” means the division of adult protective services of the department of human services;

(4) “Caregiver”:

(A)(i) Means a relative or person who has a legal duty to provide care for an elderly or vulnerable adult, whether such duty arises by the relative or person’s claim or conduct, contract, or in any other fashion; or

(ii) Means a person who is married to or in a dating, romantic, or sexual relationship with someone who qualifies as a caregiver under subdivision (4)(A)(i) and resides with or has regular contact with the elderly or vulnerable adult; and

(B) Does not include a financial institution as a caregiver of property, funds, or other assets unless the financial institution has entered into an agreement, or has been appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction, to act as a trustee with regard to the property of the adult;

(5) “Confinement”:

(A) Means the knowing and unreasonable restriction of movement of an elderly or vulnerable adult by a caregiver;

(B) Includes, but is not limited to:

(i) Placing a person in a locked room;

(ii) Involuntarily separating a person from the person’s living area;

(iii) The use of physical restraining devices on a person; or

(iv) The provision of unnecessary or excessive medications to a person; and

(C) Does not include the use of the methods or devices described in subdivision (5)(B) if used in a licensed facility in a manner that conforms to state and federal standards governing confinement and restraint;

(6) “Elderly adult” means a person seventy (70) years of age or older;

(7) “Financial exploitation” means:

(A) The use of deception, intimidation, undue influence, force, or threat of force to obtain or exert unauthorized control over an elderly or vulnerable adult’s property with the intent to deprive the elderly or vulnerable adult of property;

(B) The breach of a fiduciary duty to an elderly or vulnerable adult by the person’s guardian, conservator, or agent under a power of attorney which results in an appropriation, sale, or transfer of the elderly or vulnerable adult’s property; or

(C) The act of obtaining or exercising control over an elderly or vulnerable adult’s property, without receiving the elderly or vulnerable adult’s effective consent, by a caregiver or accomplice committed with the intent to benefit the caregiver or other third party;

(8)(A) “Neglect” means:

(i) The failure of a caregiver to provide the care, supervision, or services necessary to maintain the physical health of an elderly or vulnerable adult, including, but not limited to, the provision of food, water, clothing, medicine, shelter, medical services, a medical treatment plan prescribed by a healthcare professional, basic hygiene, or supervision that a reasonable person would consider essential for the well-being of an elderly or vulnerable adult;

(ii) The failure of a caregiver to make a reasonable effort to protect an elderly or vulnerable adult from abuse, sexual exploitation, neglect, or financial exploitation by others;

(iii) Abandonment; or

(iv) Confinement; and

(B) Neglect can be the result of repeated conduct or a single incident;

(9) “Physical harm” means an action, regardless of gravity or duration, that:

(A) Causes pain or injury; or

(B) Would cause a reasonable person to suffer pain or injury;

(10) “Relative” means a current or former spouse; child, including stepchild, adopted child, or foster child; parent, including stepparent, adoptive parent, or foster parent; sibling of the whole or half-blood; step-sibling; grandparent, of any degree; grandchild, of any degree; and aunt, uncle, niece, and nephew, of any degree, who:

(A) Resides with or has frequent or prolonged contact with the elderly or vulnerable adult; and

(B) Knows or reasonably should know that the elderly or vulnerable adult is unable to adequately provide for the adult’s own care or financial resources;

(11) “Serious physical harm” means physical harm of such gravity that:

(A) Would normally require medical treatment or hospitalization;

(B) Involves acute pain of such duration that it results in substantial suffering;

(C) Involves any degree of prolonged pain or suffering; or

(D) Involves any degree of prolonged incapacity;

(12) “Serious psychological injury” means any mental harm that would normally require extended medical treatment, including hospitalization or institutionalization, or mental harm involving any degree of prolonged incapacity;

(13) “Sexual exploitation” means an act committed upon or in presence of an elderly or vulnerable adult, without that adult’s effective consent, that is committed for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, or for the purpose of dissemination to others by a person who knew or should have known the act would offend or embarrass a reasonable person. “Sexual exploitation” includes, but is not limited to, sexual contact, as defined in § 39-13-501; exposure of genitals to an elderly or vulnerable adult; exposure of sexual acts to an elderly or vulnerable adult; exposure of an elderly or vulnerable adult’s sexual organs; an intentional act or statement by a person intended to shame, degrade, humiliate, or otherwise harm the personal dignity of an elderly or vulnerable adult; or an act or statement by a person who knew or should have known the act or statement would cause shame, degradation, humiliation, or harm to the personal dignity of an elderly or vulnerable adult. “Sexual exploitation” does not include any act intended for a valid medical purpose, or any act reasonably intended to be a normal caregiving act, such as bathing by appropriate persons at appropriate times; and(14) “Vulnerable adult” means a person eighteen (18) years of age or older who, because of intellectual disability or physical dysfunction, is unable to fully manage the person’s own resources, carry out all or a portion of the activities of daily living, or fully protect against neglect, exploitation, or hazardous or abusive situations without assistance from others.

(a) A caregiver commits the offense of aggravated neglect of an elderly or vulnerable adult who commits neglect pursuant to § 39-15-507, and the act:

(1) Results in serious physical harm; or

(2) Results in serious bodily injury.

(b) In order to convict a person for a violation of subdivision (a)(1), it is not necessary for the state to prove the elderly or vulnerable adult sustained serious bodily injury as required by § 39-13-102, but only that the neglect resulted in serious physical harm.

(c) A violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class C felony.

(d) A violation of subdivision (a)(2) is a Class B felony.

(a) A person commits the offense of aggravated abuse of an elderly or vulnerable adult who knowingly commits abuse pursuant to § 39-15-510, and:

(1) The act results in serious psychological injury or serious physical harm;

(2) A deadly weapon is used to accomplish the act or the abuse involves strangulation as defined in § 39-13-102; or

(3) The abuse results in serious bodily injury.

(b) A violation of subdivision (a)(1) is a Class C felony.

(c) A violation of subdivision (a)(2) or (a)(3) is a Class B felony.

(a) The general assembly finds and declares that it is the right of every person regardless of race, color, ancestry, religion or national origin, to be secure and protected from fear, intimidation, harassment and bodily injury caused by the activities of groups and individuals. It is not the intent of this section to interfere with the exercise of rights protected by the constitution of the United States. The general assembly recognizes the constitutional right of every citizen to harbor and express beliefs on any subject whatsoever and to associate with others who share similar beliefs. The general assembly further finds that the advocacy of unlawful acts by groups or individuals against other persons or groups for the purpose of inciting and provoking damage to property and bodily injury or death to persons is not constitutionally protected, poses a threat to public order and safety, and should be subject to criminal sanctions.

(b) A person commits the offense of intimidating others from exercising civil rights who:

(1) Injures or threatens to injure or coerces another person with the intent to unlawfully intimidate another from the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured by the constitution or laws of the state of Tennessee;

(2) Injures or threatens to injure or coerces another person with the intent to unlawfully intimidate another because that other exercised any right or privilege secured by the constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of the state of Tennessee;

(3) Damages, destroys or defaces any real or personal property of another person with the intent to unlawfully intimidate another from the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured by the constitution or laws of the state of Tennessee; or

(4) Damages, destroys or defaces any real or personal property of another person with the intent to unlawfully intimidate another because that other exercised any right or privilege secured by the constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of the state of Tennessee.

(c) It is an offense for a person to wear a mask or disguise with the intent to violate subsection (b).

(d) A violation of subsection (b) is a Class D felony. A violation of subsection (c) is a Class A misdemeanor.

(e) The penalties provided in this section for intimidating others from exercising civil rights do not preclude victims from seeking any other remedies, criminal or civil, otherwise available under law.

The following definitions apply in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:
 

(1) “Community” means the judicial district, as defined by § 16-2-506, in which a violation is alleged to have occurred;
 

(2) “Material” means:
 

(A) Any picture, drawing, photograph, undeveloped film or film negative, motion picture film, videocassette tape or other pictorial representation;
 

(B) Any statue, figure, theatrical production or electrical reproduction;
 

(C) Any image stored on a computer hard drive, a computer disk of any type, or any other medium designed to store information for later retrieval;
 

(D) Any image transmitted to a computer or other electronic media or video screen, by telephone line, cable, satellite transmission, or other method that is capable of further transmission, manipulation, storage or accessing, even if not stored or saved at the time of transmission; or
 

(E) Any computer image, or computer-generated image, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means;
 

(3) “Minor” means any person who has not reached eighteen (18) years of age;
 

(4) “Patently offensive” means that which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such matters;
 

(5) “Performance” means any play, motion picture, photograph, dance, or other visual representation that can be exhibited before an audience of one (1) or more persons;
 

(6) “Promote” means to finance, produce, direct, manufacture, issue, publish, exhibit or advertise, or to offer or agree to do those things;
 

(7) “Prurient interest” means a shameful or morbid interest in sex; and
 

(8) “Sexual activity” means any of the following acts:
 

(A) Vaginal, anal or oral intercourse, whether done with another person or an animal;
 

(B) Masturbation, whether done alone or with another human or an animal;
 

(C) Patently offensive, as determined by contemporary community standards, physical contact with or touching of a person’s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks or breasts in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or sexual abuse;
 

(D) Sadomasochistic abuse, including flagellation, torture, physical restraint, domination or subordination by or upon a person for the purpose of sexual gratification of any person;
 

(E) The insertion of any part of a person’s body or of any object into another person’s anus or vagina, except when done as part of a recognized medical procedure by a licensed professional;
 

(F) Patently offensive, as determined by contemporary community standards, conduct, representations, depictions or descriptions of excretory functions; or
 

(G) Exhibition of the breast, genitals, buttocks, anus, or pubic or rectal area of any minor that can be reasonably construed as being for the purpose of the sexual arousal or gratification of the defendant or another.

(a)(1) It is unlawful for a person to knowingly promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange material, or possess with the intent to promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange material, that includes a minor engaged in:

(A) Sexual activity; or

(B) Simulated sexual activity that is patently offensive.

(2) A person who violates subdivision (a)(1) may be charged in a separate count for each individual image, picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture film, videocassette tape, or other pictorial representation. Where the number of materials involved in a violation under subdivision (a)(1) is greater than twenty-five (25), the person may be charged in a single count to enhance the class of offense under subdivision (a)(4).

(3) In a prosecution under this section, the trier of fact may consider the title, text, visual representation, internet history, physical development of the person depicted, expert medical testimony, expert computer forensic testimony, and any other relevant evidence, in determining whether a person knowingly promoted, sold, distributed, transported, purchased, exchanged or possessed the material for these purposes, or in determining whether the material or image otherwise represents or depicts that a participant is a minor.

(4) A violation of this section is a Class C felony; however, if the number of individual images, materials, or combination of images and materials that are promoted, sold, distributed, transported, purchased, exchanged or possessed, with intent to promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange, is more than twenty-five (25), then the offense shall be a Class B felony.

(b)(1) It is unlawful for a person to knowingly promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange material that is obscene, as defined in § 39-17-901, or possess material that is obscene, with the intent to promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange the material, which includes a minor engaged in:

(A) Sexual activity; or

(B) Simulated sexual activity that is patently offensive.

(2) A person who violates subdivision (b)(1) may be charged in a separate count for each individual image, picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture film, videocassette tape, or other pictorial representation. Where the number of materials involved in a violation under subdivision (b)(1) is greater than twenty-five (25), the person may be charged in a single count to enhance the class of offense under subdivision (b)(4).

(3) In a prosecution under this section, the trier of fact may consider the title, text, visual representation, internet history, physical development of the person depicted, expert medical testimony, expert computer forensic testimony, and any other relevant evidence, in determining whether a person knowingly promoted, sold, distributed, transported, purchased, exchanged or possessed the material for these purposes, or in determining whether the material or image otherwise represents or depicts that a participant is a minor.

(4) A violation of this section is a Class C felony; however, if the number of individual images, materials, or combination of images and materials, that are promoted, sold, distributed, transported, purchased, exchanged or possessed, with intent to promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange, is more than twenty-five (25), then the offense shall be a Class B felony.

(c) In a prosecution under this section, the state is not required to prove the actual identity or age of the minor.

(d) A person is subject to prosecution in this state under this section for any conduct that originates in this state, or for any conduct that originates by a person located outside this state, where the person promoted, sold, distributed, transported, purchased, exchanged or possessed, with intent to promote, sell, distribute, transport, purchase or exchange material within this state.

(e) It shall not be a defense to a violation of subsection (a) that the minor victim of the offense consented to the conduct that constituted the offense.

(a) Notwithstanding whether a person has a permit issued pursuant to § 39-17-1315 or § 39-17-1351 or § 39-17-1366, it is an offense for a person to possess a handgun while under the influence of alcohol or any controlled substance or controlled substance analogue.

(b) It is an offense for a person to possess a firearm if the person is both:

(1) Within the confines of an establishment open to the public where liquor, wine or other alcoholic beverages, as defined in § 57-3-101(a), or beer, as defined in § 57-6-102, are served for consumption on the premises; and

(2) Consuming any alcoholic beverage listed in subdivision (b)(1).

(c)(1) A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

(2) In addition to the punishment authorized by subdivision (c)(1), if the violation is of subsection (a), occurs in an establishment described in subdivision (b)(1), and the person has a handgun permit issued pursuant to § 39-17-1351 or § 39-17-1366, such permit shall be suspended in accordance with § 39-17-1352 for a period of three (3) years.

(a) Felonies are classified for the purpose of sentencing into five (5) categories:

(1) Class A felonies;

(2) Class B felonies;

(3) Class C felonies;

(4) Class D felonies; and

(5) Class E felonies.

(b) An offense designated a felony without specification as to category is a Class E felony.

(c) Misdemeanors are classified for the purpose of sentencing into three (3) categories:

(1) Class A misdemeanors;

(2) Class B misdemeanors; and

(3) Class C misdemeanors.

(d) An offense designated as a misdemeanor without specification as to category is a Class A misdemeanor.

(a) Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Papers may be electronically signed in accordance with Rule 5B. Each paper shall state, to the extent available, the signer’s address, telephone number, e-mail address, and Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility number. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.

(b) Appearance of Counsel and Notification by Counsel Subject to Limited Scope Representation. An attorney providing limited scope representation to an otherwise unrepresented party shall file at the beginning of the representation an initial notice of limited scope representation with the court, simply stating that the representation is subject to a written limited scope representation agreement without disclosing the terms of the agreement. In addition to the initial notice of limited scope representation, when provided notice by another party, attorney or the court of a motion, pleading, discovery, hearing or other proceeding that is outside of the scope of the services provided pursuant to the limited scope representation agreement, an attorney shall promptly file a notice of limited appearance that the attorney does not represent the otherwise unrepresented party for purposes of the motion, pleading, discovery, hearing or other proceeding. The notice of limited appearance shall simply state that the limited scope representation does not include representation for purposes of the motion, pleading, discovery, hearing or other proceeding noticed and shall not otherwise disclose the terms of the limited scope representation agreement. The notice of limited appearance shall provide the otherwise unrepresented client with the deadline(s), if any, for responding to the motion, pleading, discovery, hearing or other proceeding and shall state the date, place and time of any hearing or other proceeding. If an initial notice of limited scope representation or a notice of limited appearance is filed, service shall be made as provided in Rule 5.02.

(c) Withdrawal of Counsel Upon Completion of a Limited Scope Representation.  Upon the filing of a notice of completion of limited scope representation that is accompanied by a declaration from the attorney indicating that the attorney’s obligations under a limited scope representation agreement have been satisfied, and that the attorney provided the otherwise unrepresented person at least fourteen (14) days advance written notice of the filing of notice of completion of limited scope representation, the attorney shall have withdrawn from representation in the case.

If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision 11.02 has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision 11.02 or are responsible for the violation.
 

(1) How Initiated.
 

(a) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision 11.02. It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees.
 

(b) On Court’s Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision 11.02 and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision 11.02 with respect thereto.
 

(2) Nature of Sanctions; Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (a) and (b), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.
 

(a) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a violation of subdivision 11.02(2).
 

(b) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court’s initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
 

(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.